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COM(87>  111  final I.  INTRODUCTION 
PROPOSAL  FOR  A DIRECTIVE 
COORDINATING  THE  REGULATIONS  ON 
INSIDER  TRADING 
Explanatory  memorandum 
1.  Securities  markets  have  an  important  role  to  play  in  a  modern  market 
economy.  Their  main  function  is  to  make  avai table  to  those  involved  in 
business  activity  the  financial  resources  they  require.  Securities  markets 
therefore  constitute  a  source  of  finance  which  is  essential  for  maintaining 
and,  possibly,  restoring  the  balance  between  companies'  equity  and  loan 
capital.  They  therefore  act  as  a  regulating  mechanism  which  is  essential  to 
the  smooth  functioning  of  a  modern  market  economy.  In  a  continually  changing 
.economy,  such  as  that of  the  Community,  the  role of  securities markets,  and 
more  pa~ticularly of  secondary  markets,  is bound  to  increase,  since  the  growth 
of  that  economy  will  req~i~e more  and  more  investment. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their  role  as  provider  of  capital  to  the 
full,  the  secondary  securities markets  must  ensure  at  all  times  that  there  is 
as  broad  a  match  as  possible  between  supply  and  demand.  The  extent  of  that 
match  and  therefore the  depth  and  liquidity of  those  markets  depend,  amongst 
other  things,  on  the  assurance  given .to  investors  that  prices  quoted  reflect 
all  the  facts  and  that  therefore  all  possible  measures  have  been  taken  to - 2  -
ensure equality of opportunity  for  all  investors.  In other  words,  the  proper 
operation  of  securities  markets  depends  on  the  degree  of  confidence  they 
inspire  in  investors. 
Consequently,  insider trading,  which  enables  persons  with  inside  information 
to make  gains at  the  expense  of other  investors,  constitutes  a  threat  to the 
proper  operation  of  the  securities  markets,  since  it  totally  undermines 
equality  of  opportunity  for  investors  and  therefore  also  their  confidence  in 
those markets.  If the proper operation of  those  markets  is to  be  safeguarded, 
it  is  therefore  essential  to  eliminate  that  threat  through  measures  designed 
to  prevent  the  use  of  inside  information  in securities transactions. 
2.  With  a  view  to  ensur.ing  the  proper  operation  of  the  securities  markets, 
some  Member  States  have  introduced  rules  and  regulations  governing  insider 
trading  and  others plan  to do  so. 
At  the present  time  four  of  the  Member  States  have  such  rules  and  regulations: 
Denmark,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  adopted  legislation penalizing  the 
exploitation of  inside  information,  while  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  has 
introduced  rules  under  which  market  operators  voluntarily  undertake  not  to 
exploit  inside  information  at  their disposal.  However,  br.eaches  of  those  rules 
are  not  penalized.  Belgium,  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands  are  in the  process  of 
finalizing  legislation  on  insider  trading.  In  the  other  Member  States, 
however,  no  specific  rui:E!s  and  regulations  have  been  introduced to  deal  with 
.the problems  of  insider trading,  except  for  a  code  of  conduct  drawn  up  by  the 
Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange  in  the  Netherlands. 
This  review  of  the  situation  in  the  various  Member  States  thus  shows  that 
there are very  marked  differences  between  the  rules  and  regulations  on  insider 
trading. - 3  -
It would  therefore  seem  necessary  for  rules  and  regulations  to  be  coordinated 
at  Community  level  in  order  to  make  the  s~feguards offered  investors  by  the 
different  securities  markets  more  uniform  and  thus  to  contribute  to  greater 
interpenetration  of  those  markets.  In  other  words,  such  coordination  is 
necessary if  a  genuine  European  securities  market  which  is both  efficient and 
fair  is  to  be  created.  The  present  ·prop'!sal  therefore  represents  a  step 
towards  the  setting-up of  a  European  capital market. 
3.  The  proposal  also  constitutes  an.  essential  supplement 
Directives  already  adopted  or  bein~.  ~onsidered  by  the 
securities field: 
to  the  following 
Council  in  the 
-Council  Directive  79/279/EEC  of  5  March  1979  coordinating the  conditions  for 
the admission  of  securities  t~ official  stock  exchange  listing;1 
-Council  Directive 80/390/EEC  of  17  March  1980  coordinating  the  requirements 
for  the  drawing-up,  scrutiny and  distribution of  the  listing particulars to  be 
published  for  the  admission  of  securities to official  stock  exchange  listing;2 
-Council  Directive 82/121/EEC  of  15  February  1982  on  i~formation  to  be 
published  on  a  regular  basis  by  companies  the  shares  of  which  have  been 
admitted  to official stock-exchange  listing;3 
/''' 
the  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  information  to  be  published  when  major 
holdings  in  the  capital  of  a  listed company  are  acquired or disposed of.4 
~OJ  No  L 66,  16.3.1979. 
3oJ  No  L 100,  17.4.1980. 
4oJ  No  L 48,  20.2.1982. 
OJ  No  C 351,  31.12.1985. - 4 -
Like  the above  Directives,  the  present  proposal  also aims: 
to  provide effective protection for  investors  on  securities markets; 
to  ensure  proper operation of securities markets  throughout  the  Community; 
to  promote,  at  Community  level,  greater  interpenetration  of  national 
securities markets. 
II.  COMMENTARY 
1.  Definition of  insiders 
With  regard  to  the definition of  insiders,  there  is a  choice  between  a  narrow 
approach  and  a  broader  approach. 
The  narrow  approach  would  have  been  to  limit  the  coverage  of  the  Directive to 
''primary  insiders",  that  is to  say  those  who  by  their profession or occupation 
are  in  a  fiduciary  relationship with  or  have  a  duty  of  confidentiality towards 
the  company  whose  shares  are  in question. 
It has  become  clear from  re~ent cases  on  international  securities  markets  that 
such  an  approach  would  be  foo  limited.  There  is a  significant  risk  in modern 
deregulated  markets,  particularly where  financial  institutions  are  no  Longer 
specialised,  that  individuals,  whether  acting  on  their  own  account  or 
otherwise,  could  make  a  practice of  procuring  privileged  information  from  the 
"primary  insiders"  and  indeed  they  are  or  will  be  the  main  beneficiaries. 
Accordingly,  if  confidence  in  securities markets  is  to  be  maintai.ned,  it  is 
also  necessary  to  cover  those  persons  - often  described  as  "tippees"  - who 
obtain  such  privileged  information  from  the  primary  insiders  and  use  it  to 
their  own  advantage. 
The  Directive  accordingly  adopts  the  broader  approach  and  covers  both 
categories of  potential  insider.  Articles  1  and  2 of  the  Directive define  the 
prohibitions to  be  imposed  on  primary  insiders,  i.e.  persons  who,  by  reason  of 
their professional  position,  are  likely  to have  access  to inside  information. 
Article  3  defines  the  prohibitions  to  be  imposed  on  secondary  insiders,  who 
obtain their  inside  information  from  persons  in  the first  category. .. 
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2.  Definition of  inside  information 
Inside  information  is  defined  in  Article  6.  For  information  to  be  inside 
information,  the  following  conditions must  be  met: 
- the  information  must  be  unknown  to the  public,  i.e.  not  yet  published; 
- it  must  also  be  of  a  sufficiently  specific  nature.  A simple  rumour  cannot 
therefore be  regarded  as  inside  information; 
- it  must  relate  to  one  or  more  issuer-s  of  securities  or  to  one  or  more 
securities  ;  this condition  therefore covers  information  concerning  an  issuer, 
whether  originating  from  within  the  issuer  (for  example,  an  increase  in 
profits)  or  ou~side it  (for  example,  a  bid  to take  it over  launched  by  another 
company).  It  also covers  information on  the situation  or  prospects  of  one  or 
more  securities  and  information  which  is  likely  to  influence  the  market  as 
such  (for  example,  the  decision of  a  central  bank  to alter the discount  rate>; 
- the  fourth  and  final  condition  is  that  the  information  must  be  likely  to 
have  a  material  effect  on  the price of  the  security or  securities  in question. 
All  information  unknown  to  the  public  is  not  therefore  necessarily  inside 
information.  If  such  were  the  case,  the  managers  or directors  or  even  most  of 
the  employees  of  a  compapy  would  never  be  able  to  carry  out  transactions  in 
/" 
the  securities  of  their  companies,  since  they  always  have  information  which 
has  not  been  published. 
3.  Prohibitions  imposed  on  insiders 
The  prohibitions  which  the  Direcfive  imposes  on  insiders  are  set  out  in 
Articles  1  to 3  of  the  Directive. 
(a)  First,  the  primary  insiders  defined  in  Article  1,  who  acquire  inside 
information  in  the  exercise  of  their  profession  or  duties  must  be 
prohibited  from  taking  advantage  of  such  information  to.  buy  or  sell, 
either  directly  or  through  the  medium  of  another  person,  securities 
admitted to trading on  the  stock  exchange  market. - 6  -
This  prohibition therefore applies  where: 
- the  insider  has  acquired  inside  information  in  the  exercise  of  his 
profession or duties; 
- the  insider  carries out  a  transaction  in a  security admitted  to trading 
on  the  stock  exchange  market,  whether  on  the  official  market  or  on  a 
parallel  stock  market  such  as  the  "Second  Marche"  in  France  or  the 
Unlisted  Securities  Market  in  the  United  Kingdom.  It  should  be  noted 
that  the  transaction  need  not  necessarily  be  carried  out  on  the  stock 
exchange  market  itself.  Off-market  transactions are  also covered  if they 
are  carried  out  through  a  professional  intermediary  such  as  a  bank, 
stockbroker or dealer; 
- the  insider  takes  advantage  of  the  inside  information,  i.e.  if  his 
decision  to  buy  or  sell  securities  has  been  taken  in  the  light  of that 
information.  If  a  transaction  is  not  triggered  by  inside  information, 
therefore,  it  is not  covered  by  the prohibition. 
(b)  Set:ond,  the  insiders  defined  in  Article  1  must  also  be  prohibited  from 
disclosing  inside  information  at  their  disposal.  Insiders  should  not 
therefore  be  able  to  communicate  such  information  to  a  third  party unless 
it  is  necessary or  appropriate  for  them  to  do  so  in  the  normal  course  of 
exercising their  profesy,:ion  or duties. 
(c)  Third,  a  ban  must  be  imposed  on  what  is  commonly  called  "tipping". 
Insiders  in  possession of  inside  information  may  not  use  such  information 
to  recommend  a  third  party  to  buy  or  sell  securities admitted  to trading 
on  the  stock  exchange market. 
(d)  The  secondary  insiders,  defined  in  Article  3,  are  similarly  prohibited 
either  from  knowingly  taking  advantage  of  inside  information  disclosed  to 
them  by  primary  insiders  to  buy  or  sell,  either  directly  or  indirectly, 
securities  admitted  to  trading  on  the  stock  exchange  market.  They  are 
further  prohibited  from  disclosing· such  information  to  third  parties  or 
from  using  that  information  to  recommend  a  third  party  to  buy  or  sell 
securities. - 7  -
4.  The  rules  governing territorial application 
Articles  1  and  2  of  the  proposal  for  a  Dir,ective  determine which  Member  State 
is competent  to  act  in the  event  of  insider trading.  The  rules on  territorial 
application  in  those  Articles are as  follows: 
Article  1  stipulates that,  in the event  of  a  purchase  or  sale of  securities 
by  an  insider,  the  competent  Member  State  is  that  on  whose  territory  the 
purchase or sate took  place.  Where  such, a purchase or sale  is  carried out  on 
the  stock  exchange  market,  the  competent  Member  State  is  clearly  that  in 
which  the  stock  exchange  in  question.  is  located  or  operates.  Territorial 
application  is  a  much  more  complex  matter  where  a  purchase  or  sale  is 
carried out  outside  the  stock  exchange  market,  since  there  is  no  real  Link 
with  a  given  country.  The  transaction  c~n be  regarded  as  having  been  carried 
out  on  the territory  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  insider  is  resident; 
however,  it can  also be  regarded  as  having  been  carried out  on  the territory 
of  the  Member  State  in which  the other  party  to  the transaction is resident. 
This  second  criterion  has  been  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  the  proposed 
Directive because  the other party  to  a  transaction carried out  by  an  insider 
is  a  victim of  that  insider,  and  it is the  victim that  must  be  protected  (by 
giving  jurisdiction  where  necessary  to  the  courts  of  the  Member  State  in 
which  that  victim is  resident). 
- The  question  of  compet_,.e,nce  in  the  case  of  breaches  of  the  two  other  bans 
laid  down  in  Article  2  does  not  raise  any  problems.  If  an  insider 
communicates  inside  information to a  third party or if he  recommends  a  third 
party,  on  the  basis  of  such  information,  to  buy  or  sell  securities,  the 
Member  State  in which  the  insider  is  resident  is clearly  competent  since the 
offence  has  been  committed  by  that:i~sider. 
5.  Publication  of  inside  information 
Prompt  publication  of  inside  information  is  the  best  means  of  preventing 
insider  trading,  since it  reduces  to  a  minimum  the  period  during  which  such 
information  is  inside  information  because  it  is  known  only  to a  small  number 
of  persons. 
The  proposed  Directive  accordingly  contains  a  provision  (Article  7>  which 
requires  companies  whose  securities  are  admitted  to  trading  on  the  stock 
exchange  market  to  inform  the  public  immediately  of  any  circumstance  or 
decision which  would  be  likely to  influence the price of those securities. - 8  -
However,  if  such  information  cannot  be  published  immediately  since  it  would 
harm  the  legitimate  interests  of  the  company,  that  company  must  immediately 
inform  the  competent  authorities,  who  may  relieve  it  of  the  obligation  to 
publish  it immediately. 
The  Directive of  5  March  1979  coordinating the  conditions  for  the admission  of 
securities  to  official  stock  exchange  listing  already  imposes  on  listed 
companies  an  obligation to  provide  such  information. 
Point  5(a)  of  Schedule  C annexed  to  that  Directive stipulates that: 
"The  company  must  inform  the  public  as  soon  as  possible  of  any  major  new 
developments  in  its  sphere  of  activity  which  are  not  public  knowledge  and 
which  may,  by  virtue  of  their  effect  on  its  assets  and  liabilities  or 
financial  position  or  on  the  general  course  of  its  business,  lead  to 
substantial movements  in  the prices of  its shares. 
The  competent  authorities  may,  however,  exempt  the  company  from  this 
requirement,  if  the  disclosure  of  particular  information  is  such  as  to 
prejudice  the  legitimate  interests of  the  company." 
However,  this  provision of  the  Directive  on  the  conditions  for  the  admission 
of  securities  to  stock  exchange  listing  applies only  to  issuers  of  securities 
;: .. 
officially  listed  on  a  stock  exchange.  For  the  purpose  of  the  present 
legislation,  therefore,  it  must  be  supplemented  by  a  similar  but  wider. 
provision  which  also  covers  issuers  whose  securities  are  admitted  to  trading 
on  a  market  other  than  the  official  one,  for  example  the  "Second  March~" in 
France,  the  "Mercato  Ristretto"  in  Italy or  the  Unlisted Securities  Market  in 
the  United  Kingdom. 
6.  Monitoring  of  the  application of  the provisions of  the proposed  Directive 
It  is  essential  that  supervisory  authorities  be  designated  to  monitor 
application  of· all  rules  and  regulations  designed  to  combat  insider  trading 
effectively.  Without  such  authorities,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  detect 
insider trading and  in particular to identify those  responsible. 
This  is  why  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  stipulates  that  each  Member  State 
must  designate  the  authority  or  authorities  competent  to  oversee  application 
of  the  provisions of  the  proposal.  In  order  to be  able  to  carry  out  that  task 
.. .· 
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with  maximum  efficiency,  those  authorities  should  be  given  all  the  powers 
necessary  for  the  exercise  of  their  duties.  Thus,  they  should  have 
sufficiently wide  investigative powers  to oe  able to  ascertain  from  financial 
intermediaries  their clients•  true identities. 
Also  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  proper  application of  the  provisions  of  the 
proposed  Directive,  the  proposal  introduces  the  principle  of  cooperation 
between  the  competent  authorities  in  the  various  Member  States.  As  the 
competence  of  the  nat~onal authorities  and,  in particulat, their  investigative 
powers  are  limited  territorially,  such  cooperation  may  be  essential  for 
tracing  a  string  of  transactions  .and  identifying,  in  the  event  of 
cross-frontier transactions,  the  insiders  ultimately  responsible. 
Cooperation  between  supervisory  authori.ties  should  normally  take  the  form  of 
information exchanges.  The  proposal  for  a  Directive therefore provides  for  the 
authorities  in  the  Member  States  to  exchange  any  information  required  for 
carrying  out  their duties.  In  order to  ensure  that  information  communicated  in 
this  way  remains  confidential,  provision  has  been  made  for  it  to be  covered  by 
the obligation of  professional  secrecy. 
Provision  has  also  been  made  for  the  responsibilities of  the  Contact  Committee 
set  up  by  the  Directive.  coordinating  the  conditions  for  the  admission  of 
securities  to  official  stock  exchange  listing  to  be  extended  to  include  the 
/' ,. 
field  covered  by  the  present  proposal  for  a  Directive.  The  Contact  Committee 
will  have  the  task  of  facilitating  the  harmonized  implementation  of  the 
Directive's  provisions  through  the  exchange  of  views.  It  will  ~lso  be 
responsible  for  advising  the  Commission,  i~ necessary,  on  any  additions  or 
amendments  to  the  Directive.  Final.ly,  by  providing  a  forum  for  regular 
contacts  between  the authorities  in  the  different  Member  States this  Committee 
should  also  promote  effective  cooperation  between  those  authorities,  which 
should  help  in  combating  insider trading. .  . 
No C 153/8  Official Journal of the European Communities  11. 6. 87 
Article 4 
1.  Where the procedure set out in  this Article is  to be 
followed,  the Standing Veterinary Committee, instituted 
by Council  Decision  68/361/EEC (') and  the  CADDIA 
Steering  Committee,  instituted  by  Council  Decision 
85/214/EEC ('),  shall  give  an  opinion  on  matters 
referred to them by the Commission. 
(')  OJ No L 255,  18.  10.  1968, p.  23. 
(')  OJ No L 96, 3. 4.  1985, p.  35. 
2.  In  requesting  e  opm10n  of  the  Committees 
mentioned  in  pa  graph  1,  the  Commission  may  fix  a 
which this opinion shall be delivered. 
The  d  erations  of  these  Committees  shall  not  be 
folio  d  by  a  vote.  However,  each  member  of  the 
Co  mittees may demand that his opinion be  recorded in 
e minutes. 
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COM(B  7)  111 final 
(Submitted by the  Commission to  the  Council on  25 May 1987). 
(87/C 153/09) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community,  and  in  particular  Article  54 
thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal frJrn the Commission, 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  European  Par-
liament, 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  tM'e'.  Economic  and 
Social Committee, 
Whereas Article 54 (3) (g) provides that the Council shall 
coordinate to  the necessary extent the safeguards which, 
for the protection of the intere.sts of members. and others, 
are  required  by  Member  States  of companies  or  firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 
with  a  view  to  making  such  safeguards  equivalent 
throughout the Community; 
Whereas the secondary  market in  transferable  securities 
.plays an important role in  the financing of undertakings; 
Whereas,  for it  to  be  able  to  play  that role  effectively, 
every  possible  measure  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that 
that market operates smoothly; 
Whereas the smooth operation of the  secondary market 
depends to a large extent on the confidence it  inspires in 
investors; 
Whereas  one  of .the  factors  on  which  such  confidence 
depends is  the  assurances  afforded to investors that they 
are placed on an equal footing; 
Whereas  insider  trading,  by  benefiting  certain  investors 
at  the  expense  of  others,  is  likely  to  undermine  that 
confidence  and  may  therefore  prejudice  the  smooth 
operation  of  the  secondary  market  in  transferable 
securities; 
Whereas it  is  therefore necessary to take all  appropriate 
measures to combat insider trading; 
Whereas  in  most  Member States  there  are  no  rules  or 
regulations prohibiting insider trading; whereas the rules 
or regulations  that  do  exist  differ  appreciably  between 
Member States; 
Whereas  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  adopt coordinated 
Community rules in this field; 
Whereas such  coordinated rules also  have the advantage 
of helping,  thr9ugh cooperation between the competent 
authorities,  to combat transfrontier insider trading more 
effectively, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
I.  Member  States  shall  prohibit  any  person  who,  in 
the  exercise  of his  profession  or duties,  acquires  inside 
information  as  defined  in  Article  6  from  taking 
advantage  of that  information  to  buy  or sell  on  their 
territory,  either  directly  or  through  another  person, 
transferable securities admitted to trading on their stock 
exchange markets. 
Where the  purchase or sale  of transferable securities  is 
carried  out  on  a  stock  exchange  market,  it  shall  be 
deemed to be  carried out on the territory of the Member 
State in  which the stock exchange in  question  is  situated 
or operates. 
• . '  "" 
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Where the purchase  or sale  of transferable  secunues  is 
carried out outside a stock exchange market, it  shall  be 
deemed to be carried out on the territory of the Member 
State iri  which the counterpart of the person referred  to 
in  the first subparagraph is  resident. 
2.  The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall  not 
apply to transferable securities  bought or sold outside a 
stock  exchange  market  without  the  involvement  of  a 
professional intermediary. 
Article 2 
Member States shall prohibit any person who is  resident 
on their territory and who acquires inside information in 
the exercise of his profession or duties from: 
disclosing  that  inside  information  to  a  third  party 
unless  such disclosure  is· made in  the  normal  course 
of exercising his profession or duties, 
using  that inside  information  to recommend a  third 
party to buy or sell transferable securities admitted to 
trading on their stock exchange markets. 
Article 3 
1.  Member  States  shall  impose  the  prohibition 
provided  for  in  Article  1  in  accordance  with  the  terms 
referred  to  therein  also  on  any  person  who  has 
knowingly  obtained  inside  information  from  a  person 
who has  acquired that information in  the exercise of his 
profession or duties.  .r . 
2.  Member States shall prohibit any person referred to 
in paragraph 1 : 
from  disclosing  the  inside  information  to  a  third 
party, 
from  using  that inside  information  to  recommend  a 
third  party  to  buy  or  sell  transferable  securities 
admitted to trading on their stock exchange markets. 
Article 4 
Member States may lay  down more stringent rules  than 
those contained in  this  Directive provided  that they  are 
non-discriminatory. 
Article 5 
For the purposes of this  Directive transferable securities 
shall  include  not  only securities  usually  traded  on  the 
stock exchange market such as shares and debt securities 
but also traded options relating to such securities. 
Article 6 
For the purposes of this  Directive,  inside  information is 
information unknown to the public  of a  specific  nature 
and  relating  to  one  or  more  issuers  of  transferable 
securities,  or  to  one  or  more  transferable  securities, 
which,  if  it  were  published,  would  be  likely  to  have  a 
material effect on the price of the transferable security of 
transferable securities in question. 
Article  7 
I.  Issuers whose tra~sferable securities are admitted to 
official  listing  in  one  or  more  Member  States  or  are 
traded  there  on  another  stock  exchange  market  shall 
immediately inform  the  public in  that Member State or 
those  Member  States  of  any  circumstance  or decision 
which  would  be  likely to  have  a  material  effect on  the 
price of such transferable securities. 
2.  Where  an  issuer  is  unable  to  inform  the  public 
immediately of a circumstance or decision as  referred to 
in  paragraph  I  because  disclosure  would  prejudice  its 
legitimate  interests,  it  shall  immediately  inform  the 
competent authorities  thereof, who may relieve it of the 
obligation provided for in paragraph 1. 
Article 8 
1.  Member  States  shall  designate  the  authority  or 
authorities  competent  to  ensure  that  the  provisions 
adopted  pursuant  to  this  Directive  are  applied.  They 
shall  inform  the  Commission  accordingly,  indicating,  if 
appropriate, how duties have been allocated.  · 
2.  The  competent  authorities  shall  be  given  all  such 
supervisory powers as  may be  necessary for the exercise 
of their duties. 
3.  The  competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States 
shall  cooperate wherever  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying out their duties  and  shall  exchange any  infor-
mation required for that purpose. 
Article 9 
1.  Member  .  States  shall  provide  that  all  persons 
employed or formerly employed by the competent auth-
orities  referred  to  in  Article  8  shall  be  bound by pro-
fessional  secrecy.  Information  covered  by  professional 
secrecy may not be divulged to any person or authority 
except by virtue of provisions laid down by law. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not, however, preclude exchanges 
of information  between  the  various  Member  States  by 
the authorities referred to in Article 8 as  provided for in 
this  Directive.  Information  thus  exchanged  shall  be 
covered  by  the  obligation  of  professional  secrecy  to 
which  the  persons  employed  or formerly  employed  by 
the  competent authorities  receiving  the  information  are 
subject. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'· 
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3.  Without  prejudice  to  cases  falling  under  criminal 
law, the authorities referred to in  Article 8 which receive 
information  may  use  it  only  for  the  exercise  of  their 
duties  and in  connection  with administrative  or judicial 
proceedings specifically relating to the  exercise of those 
duties. 
Article 10 
The Contact Committee set up  by Article 20  of Council 
Directive  79/279/EEC  of  5  March  1979  coordinating 
the ;conditions for  the  admission  of securities  to  official 
stock exchange listing (') shall also have as its function: 
(a)  to  facilitate  the  harmonized  implementation  of this 
Directive  .through  regular  consultations  on  any 
practical  problems  which  arise  from  its  application 
and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful; 
(')  OJ No L 66, 16. 3.  1979, p. 21. 
(b)  to advise the Commission on any amendments to be 
made to this Directive. 
Article 11 
Member  States  shall  determine  the  penalties  to  be 
applied  for infringement of the measures  taken pursuant 
to this Directive. 
Article 12 
1.  Member States shall take the measures necessary to 
comply with  this  Directive  not later  than  31  December 
1990.  They  shall  forthwith  inform  the  Commission 
thereof. 
2.  Member  States  shall  communicate  to 
Commission  the  provisions  of national  law  which 
adopt in the field governed by this  Directive. 
Article 13 
This Directive is  addressed to the Member States. 
the 
they 
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